JezK
Edit File: VerificationController.php
<?php declare( strict_types=1 ); namespace Automattic\WooCommerce\Internal\CustomerEmailVerification; /** * Drives the customer email-verification UI on My Account and processes its verify-links. * * Verification uses a one-time link emailed to the customer. Opening the link verifies the address * directly — but ONLY when the request is authenticated as the link's target user. The login gate is * the control, not the HTTP verb. * * This intentionally mirrors WordPress core's own email-change confirmation links, which likewise * complete a sensitive change on an authenticated GET carrying an unguessable secret — no interstitial, * form, or nonce — relying on the auth gate plus the secret: * * - Administration email change: wp-admin/options.php (`adminhash`) — * https://github.com/WordPress/WordPress/blob/master/wp-admin/options.php * - Profile email change: wp-admin/user-edit.php (`newuseremail`) — * https://github.com/WordPress/WordPress/blob/master/wp-admin/user-edit.php * * What makes the link safe: * * - A prefetch (email client or security scanner) is never logged in as the customer, so it can never * reach the verify branch — it only ever sees the My Account login. It cannot consume the key. * - The key is a one-time, time-limited secret bound by hash to the account's current email, so it is * inert without an authenticated session as the target: a leaked key cannot be spent by anyone who is * not already that user (which is also why, like core, it is safe to carry the key in the URL). * - An attacker who registered an account with someone else's email can't read the victim's inbox, so * never receives the link; and the victim can only reach a logged-in-as-target state by resetting the * password, which invalidates the attacker's session. * * No auth cookie is ever minted by the link (that would be exploitable as login CSRF): a logged-out * visitor is shown the My Account login on the link itself, and signing in returns them to the link * (the verify params are preserved in its URL) to complete it as themselves. * * @since 11.0.0 */ class VerificationController { /** * Nonce action used to protect the send-verification request. */ private const SEND_NONCE_ACTION = 'woocommerce-send-verification-email'; /** * Query param used to trigger the send-verification request. */ private const SEND_PARAM = 'wc_send_verification'; /** * Query param carrying the plaintext verification key. */ private const KEY_PARAM = 'wc_verify_email_key'; /** * Query param carrying the target user ID. */ private const USER_PARAM = 'wc_verify_email_user'; /** * Query param carrying a one-off result code to print as a notice on the account page. */ private const NOTICE_PARAM = 'wc_verify_notice'; /** * Minimum seconds between sends (rate limit). */ private const SEND_RATE_LIMIT = 60; /** * Verification service. * * @var EmailVerificationService */ private $service; /** * Constructor. Registers hooks. */ public function __construct() { add_action( 'template_redirect', array( $this, 'maybe_process_request' ) ); add_action( 'woocommerce_before_account_orders', array( $this, 'print_result_notice' ), 5 ); add_action( 'woocommerce_before_account_orders', array( $this, 'render_prompt' ) ); } /** * Inject dependencies. * * @internal * @param EmailVerificationService $service Verification service. */ final public function init( EmailVerificationService $service ): void { $this->service = $service; } /** * Route an incoming request: a send request or an opened verify-link. * * Opening the emailed link is a GET, which email clients and security scanners routinely prefetch. * Verification is gated on authentication ({@see self::handle_verify_link()}), so a prefetch — always * logged out — only ever reaches the My Account login and can never consume the key. * * @since 11.0.0 */ public function maybe_process_request(): void { if ( isset( $_GET[ self::SEND_PARAM ] ) ) { // phpcs:ignore WordPress.Security.NonceVerification.Recommended $this->handle_send_request(); return; } // No nonce on the verify-link: like WordPress core's email-change confirmation links, the // unguessable one-time key is the CSRF defence and the login gate is the authority. // phpcs:disable WordPress.Security.NonceVerification.Recommended if ( isset( $_GET[ self::KEY_PARAM ], $_GET[ self::USER_PARAM ] ) ) { $this->handle_verify_link( absint( wp_unslash( $_GET[ self::USER_PARAM ] ) ), sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_GET[ self::KEY_PARAM ] ) ) ); } // phpcs:enable WordPress.Security.NonceVerification.Recommended } /** * Verify the address from an opened verify-link — gated on being logged in as the link's target user. * * The login gate is the control: verification, and key consumption, happen ONLY on the path where the * request is authenticated as $user_id. A prefetch or any logged-out visit is shown the My Account * login and never touches the key; a visitor logged in as a different account is refused without * consuming it. This is the same shape as WordPress core's email-change confirmation links * (wp-admin/options.php `adminhash`, wp-admin/user-edit.php `newuseremail`): a sensitive change * completed on an authenticated GET carrying an unguessable secret. * * @since 11.0.0 * * @param int $user_id Target user ID from the link. * @param string $key Plaintext verification key from the link. * @return void */ private function handle_verify_link( int $user_id, string $key ): void { // The key rides in the URL, so keep this response off caches and out of third-party Referer // headers (the logged-out branch renders a themed front-end page that may load such assets). nocache_headers(); if ( ! headers_sent() ) { header( 'Referrer-Policy: no-referrer' ); } $current_user_id = get_current_user_id(); // Logged out (including any prefetcher): never verify, never consume the key. Render the My // Account login; the verify params stay in the URL so signing in returns here to complete it. if ( ! $current_user_id ) { wc_add_notice( __( 'You need to be logged in to confirm your email address.', 'woocommerce' ), 'notice' ); return; } // Logged in as someone else: refuse rather than silently switching accounts. The key is untouched. if ( $current_user_id !== $user_id ) { $this->redirect_with_result( 'mismatch' ); } // Authenticated as the target — the only path that consumes the key and verifies. if ( $this->process_verification( $user_id, $key ) ) { $this->redirect_with_result( 'confirmed' ); } // Already verified (e.g. the link re-opened after the key was spent): land on Orders quietly, // without repeating the success notice for a confirmation that already happened. if ( $this->service->is_verified( $user_id ) ) { wp_safe_redirect( wc_get_account_endpoint_url( 'orders' ) ); exit; } // Authenticated as the target, but the key is invalid or expired and they are not verified. $this->redirect_with_result( 'expired' ); } /** * Handle a request to send (or resend) the verification email, triggered by the My Account prompt. * * Verifies the nonce, applies a rate-limit (does not re-send within the window), dispatches the * email, and redirects to the orders section, where the prompt points the customer to their inbox. * * @since 11.0.0 */ public function handle_send_request(): void { $user_id = get_current_user_id(); if ( ! $user_id ) { return; } $nonce = isset( $_GET['_wpnonce'] ) ? sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_GET['_wpnonce'] ) ) : ''; if ( ! wp_verify_nonce( $nonce, self::SEND_NONCE_ACTION ) ) { $this->redirect_with_result( 'invalid' ); } // Only send a fresh link once the last one is outside the rate-limit window; otherwise the // existing link still stands and the prompt continues to point the customer to their inbox. $seconds_since = $this->service->seconds_since_last_key( $user_id ); if ( null === $seconds_since || $seconds_since >= self::SEND_RATE_LIMIT ) { $this->send_verification_email( $user_id ); $this->redirect_with_result( 'sent' ); } $this->redirect_with_result( 'throttled' ); } /** * Return whether the verification prompt should be shown for the current user. * * True for a logged-in, unverified customer, except one still using a temporary password (those * confirm via their set-password link, so the temporary-password notice already covers it). This * must not depend on whether matching guest orders exist, because that would disclose order * existence before the customer proves they control the email address. * * @since 11.0.0 * * @return bool */ public function should_show_prompt(): bool { $user_id = get_current_user_id(); if ( ! $user_id ) { return false; } if ( $this->service->is_verified( $user_id ) ) { return false; } // A temporary-password account already has a set-password link (which also verifies on use), // surfaced by the temporary-password notice — don't show a second prompt alongside it. if ( get_user_option( 'default_password_nag', $user_id ) ) { return false; } return true; } /** * Render the verification prompt notice on the My Account "Orders" panel. * * Within the rate-limit window a link was sent recently, so the prompt points the customer to their * inbox and offers no immediate resend; otherwise it carries the "confirm email" call to action. * * @internal * @since 11.0.0 */ public function render_prompt(): void { if ( ! $this->should_show_prompt() ) { return; } $user_id = get_current_user_id(); $seconds_since = $this->service->seconds_since_last_key( $user_id ); if ( null !== $seconds_since && $seconds_since <= self::SEND_RATE_LIMIT ) { // A just-sent/throttled result notice (from the redirect) already points to the inbox this // page load, so don't print a second "check your inbox" alongside it. // phpcs:ignore WordPress.Security.NonceVerification.Recommended -- display-only, no state change. if ( ! isset( $_GET[ self::NOTICE_PARAM ] ) ) { wc_print_notice( esc_html__( 'Confirm your email address to check for past orders. A confirmation link was sent recently — please check your inbox.', 'woocommerce' ), 'notice' ); } return; } $send_url = wp_nonce_url( add_query_arg( self::SEND_PARAM, '1', wc_get_account_endpoint_url( 'orders' ) ), self::SEND_NONCE_ACTION ); $notice = sprintf( '<a href="%2$s" class="button wc-forward">%3$s</a> %1$s', esc_html__( 'Confirm your email address to check for past orders and link them to your account.', 'woocommerce' ), esc_url( $send_url ), esc_html__( 'Confirm email address', 'woocommerce' ) ); wc_print_notice( $notice, 'notice' ); } /** * Print the one-off result notice carried by the {@see self::NOTICE_PARAM} query arg, if any. * * Send/confirm actions redirect here with a result code rather than queuing a session notice, so the * page shows exactly the current request's outcome — re-running an action can't stack notices. * * @internal * @since 11.0.0 */ public function print_result_notice(): void { // phpcs:ignore WordPress.Security.NonceVerification.Recommended -- display-only, no state change. $code = isset( $_GET[ self::NOTICE_PARAM ] ) ? sanitize_key( wp_unslash( $_GET[ self::NOTICE_PARAM ] ) ) : ''; $notice = $this->result_notice( $code ); if ( null !== $notice ) { wc_print_notice( esc_html( $notice[0] ), $notice[1] ); } } /** * Map a redirect result code to its [ message, notice type ], or null for an unknown code. * * @param string $code Result code from a send/confirm redirect. * @return array{0: string, 1: string}|null */ private function result_notice( string $code ): ?array { switch ( $code ) { case 'sent': return array( __( 'A confirmation link has been sent to your email address. Please check your inbox.', 'woocommerce' ), 'success' ); case 'throttled': return array( __( 'A confirmation link was sent recently. Please check your inbox, or wait a moment before requesting a new one.', 'woocommerce' ), 'notice' ); case 'confirmed': return array( __( 'Your email address has been confirmed.', 'woocommerce' ), 'success' ); case 'expired': return array( __( 'This confirmation link is invalid or has expired. Please request a new one.', 'woocommerce' ), 'error' ); case 'mismatch': return array( __( 'Unable to confirm this email while you are logged in to a different account. Please log out and open the link again.', 'woocommerce' ), 'error' ); case 'invalid': return array( __( 'Invalid request. Please try again.', 'woocommerce' ), 'error' ); default: return null; } } /** * Redirect to the orders section carrying a one-off result code, then exit. * * @param string $code Result code understood by {@see self::result_notice()}. * @return never */ private function redirect_with_result( string $code ): void { wp_safe_redirect( add_query_arg( self::NOTICE_PARAM, $code, wc_get_account_endpoint_url( 'orders' ) ) ); exit; } /** * Validate a key and verify the user. * * @since 11.0.0 * * @param int $user_id User ID. * @param string $key Plaintext verification key. * @return bool True when verification succeeded. */ public function process_verification( int $user_id, string $key ): bool { if ( ! $user_id || '' === $key ) { return false; } if ( ! $this->service->check_verification_key( $user_id, $key ) ) { return false; } $this->service->mark_verified( $user_id ); return true; } /** * Send (or resend) a verification email to a user. * * @since 11.0.0 * * @param int $user_id User ID. */ public function send_verification_email( int $user_id ): void { $user = get_user_by( 'id', $user_id ); if ( ! $user ) { return; } $verify_url = $this->service->build_verification_url( $user_id ); WC()->mailer(); /** * Triggers sending of the customer email-verification email. * * @param int $user_id The WordPress user ID of the customer. * @param string $verify_url The one-time verification URL to include in the email. * * @since 11.0.0 */ do_action( 'woocommerce_customer_verify_email_notification', $user_id, $verify_url ); } }